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Involuntary Servitude: An Eighteenth-
Century Concept In Search of a
Twentieth-Century Definition
In 1865, the United States abolished slavery and involuntary servitude
through enactment of the thirteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.' Abolishing the concept of slavery did not end the modern
practice of coerced labor.2 Problems of statutory construction of the
involuntary servitude statute continue to exist.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The thirteenth amendment provides in pertinent part that
"[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." Id. Great Britain abolished slavery in 1833. Public General Acts, An Act for the
Abolition of Slavery, 1833, 3 & 4 Vil. 4, ch. 73. The British statute did not totally emancipate
slaves in the Colonies, but instead placed them into three classes of apprenticed laborers. Id. at
ch. 73, § 4. In contrast to the American emancipation, Parliament authorized the expenditure of
twenty million pounds sterling as just compensation to slave-owners. Id. at ch. 73, § 24. See U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 4. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part that "In]either the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay ... any claim for the loss or emancipation of
any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void." Id. See
generally Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12
Hous. L. Ray. 1 (1974) (discussing the legislative history of the thirteenth amendment and
reconstruction statutes).
2. U.S. CIvu Rasrrs ComM'N, JUSTICE: 1961 CoMsresSoN or CrvM RroIrrs REPORT 5, at
203 n.91 (1961). As late as 1961 there were no reported decisions under the involuntary servitude
statute in this century. Id. Such has not been the case in the past three decades. For example,
after hearing testimony from victimized migrant farm workers on the East Coast, Congresswoman
Burton commented that her husband (the late Representative Philip Burton) had sat on a California
Labor Committee in 1957 and heard about the same type of atrocities committed against workers.
Oversight Hearing on Peonage Among Agricultural Workers: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30
(1983) (statement of Rep. Burton) [hereinafter Peonage Hearings]. See also Note, Twentieth
Century Slavery Prosecutions: The Sharpening Sword, 8 C'M. Jusr. J. 47, 83-86 (1985) (detailing,
as evidenced in the Peonage Hearings, the contradictory position of the United States government
in both initiating slavery prosecutions and encouraging the practice). The following is a compilation
of actions brought under the involuntary servitude and peonage statutes:
TABLE I
1972 1973 1974 1975 1980 1981 1982 1984 1985
Indictments 13 1 2(b) 7 0 2
Convictions 2 1 4 l(d) 2
Guilty Pleas 2(a) 5(c) 3 1 4
(a) indicted the previous year.
(b) hung jury in one prosecution.
(c) church officials holding nine teenagers in involuntary servitude (three pleas).
(d) church official holding eight teenagers in involuntary servitude.
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A conflict presently exists in the federal courts regarding the statutory
definition of involuntary servitude. 4 However, some of the definitions
1972 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 86, 1973 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 73, 1974 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP.
77, 1977 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 154, 1980 AT'y GE'. ANN. REP. 127, 1981 AT'Y GEN. ANN.
REP. 123, 1982 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 157, 1984 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 147, 1985 ATr'y GEN.
ANN. REP. 165.
Letter from Albert S. Glenn, Attorney, Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division, United States
Department of Justice (Oct. 2, 1987) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal) (complete listing of all
complaints received by the United States Department of Justice during the last three fiscal years);
Letter from Lorna Grenadier, Supervisory Paralegal Specialist, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice (Dec. 23, 1987) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal) (complete listing of
involuntary servitude complaints received by the United States Department of Justice from the
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are not mutually exclusive. One definition of involuntary servitude is
the use of physical force, threats of force or legal process to exact
labor. Another definition permits a showing of psychological coercion
used by a defendant against a victim to compel service. 6 In contrast,
a third definition of involuntary servitude is met in one of two ways.
Either a showing of physical force or threat of legal process, or the
use of fraud or deceit against certain classes of victims which forces
them into a condition of involuntary servitude is enough to support a
conviction. 7 A final definition requires the government to prove that
an act by a defendant resulted in the victim believing that he or she
was not free to leave.8
First, this comment will examine the legislative history of the invol-
untary servitude and peonage statutes. 9 This section will also discuss
the intent of Congress in enacting the precursors of these statutes. 0
See also Brodie, The Federally Secured Right To Be Free From Bondage, 40 GEO. L.J. 367, 374
(1952) (partial listing of unreported successful prosecutions under both statutes as well as a general
history of involuntary servitude and peonage prosecutions).
3. See infra notes 71-191 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting judicial interpretations
of the involuntary servitude statute).
4. See United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (en banc). The Kozminski
court noted that "[t]he Courts of Appeals are squarely in conflict in their interpretation of the
words of [the involuntary servitude statute]." Id.
5. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487 (2d Cir. 1964). See infra notes 75-94 and
accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit definition of involuntary servitude, which includes
force, threat of force or legal process). See Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944). The use of
legal process usually arose in the context of defendants paying the fines of inmates in return for
the inmate working off the fine in the service of the defendant. State statutes made the inducing
of borrowing money with intent to defraud by a promise to perform labor a misdemeanor. Id.
at 5. Thus, if the inmate would refuse to work, he would be re-incarcerated. Almost invariably,
the labor-incarceration cycle would repeat itself. Such statutes were declared unconstitutional. Id.
See also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1914) (holding invalid a state law system
which allowed a "surety" to collect his debt for payment of a debtor's fine in the form of court-
sanctioned labor); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (declaring these state statutes
unconstitutional). Until recently, conventional wisdom was that the above example of indebtedness
was the only use of legal process contemplated by defendants. See infra notes 104-18, 167-75
and accompanying text (suggesting that the use of abortion, adultery, and immigration laws
constitutes coercion by means of state legal process, but only when those laws provide for
incarceration of the victim).
6. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855
(1984). See infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit definition of
involuntary servitude, which includes psychological coercion).
7. United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1192-93 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 225 (1987). See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit
defimition of involuntary servitude, which incorporates fraud or deceit, as well as the Shackney
test).
8. See infra notes 166-83 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Bernal and
United States v. Bibbs, both of which define involuntary servitude in terms of the effect on the
victim).
9. See infra notes 22-70 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
involuntary servitude and peonage statutes).
10. Id.
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Second, each judicial definition of involuntary servitude will be dis-
cussed."1 Finally, this comment will propose that the Supreme Court
adopt a bifurcated test in determining whether a state of involuntary
servitude exists.'
2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY STATUTES
The enactment of the thirteenth amendment was surrounded by
debate. 13 However, the debate focused on the wisdom of enacting the
amendment, and not on defining the words of the amendment. Op-
ponents of the thirteenth amendment argued that the amendment was
flawed in two respects. First, the provisions of the thirteenth amendment
encompassed not just the emancipation of slaves, but also mandated
the equality of blacks to whites.' 4 Second, the thirteenth amendment
also gave Congress power to regulate purely private conduct by com-
batting the incidents of servitude. 5 According to opponents, by cen-
11. See infra notes 71-191 and accompanying text (discussing the four judicial definitions).
12. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing the test for involuntary servitude
that this comment proposes).
13. Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L.
B.J. 26, 31 (1951).
14. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1865) (statement of Sen. Howard).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16
Stat. 144); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13). After enacting the thirteenth amendment, Congress passed further legislation to combat
various incidents of servitude. Incidents of servitude are generally defined as the denial of the right
to enter into contracts, the right to own property, the right to vote, the right to invoke the judicial
process. Id. An analysis which equates "slavery" with legal "badges of servitude" in all contexts is
unworkable in the context of sections 1581 and 1584 of title 18, the Crimes and Criminal Procedure
Code. If Congress intended to prohibit incidents of servitude a similar list would have been inserted
in the precursors of sections 1581 and 1584, as Congress expressly did in various other civil rights
statutes. Id. The absence of senatorial comment by Senators Sumner and Trumbull as to requiring
a list of incidents of servitude in the precursors of the peonage and involuntary servitude statutes
when colleagues uttered the words "involuntary servitude," suggests that the peonage and invol-
untary servitude statutes were not intended to cover such incidents. See, e.g., CONO. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (1867) (statement of Sen. Davis); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 240
(1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner, quoting from the Commissioner on Indian Affairs report
concerning peonage in New Mexico); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (statement
of Sen. Trumbull). Furthermore, the mere private denial of the right to own property or the right
to bear arms cannot place a victim into a condition of involuntary servitude analogous to the
state of involuntary servitude obtained by recourse to more egregious types of coercion such as
physical force or the threat of legal process. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., 478 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Saulsbury, asserting that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would set a dangerous
precedent by requiring a state to deny all citizens access to firearms and ammunition in order to
prohibit possession by "dangerous persons" such as blacks). See also United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 544-45, 553 (1876) (unsuccessful prosecution of Ku Klux Klan members for conspiring
to prevent blacks from exercising their "right to keep and bear arms for a lawful purpose"); S.
HALBROOK, THAT EvERY MAN BE AmaED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CoNsTITUONAL RiOHT 99-153
(1984) (arguing that by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the fourteenth amendment
Congress intended to ensure the right of blacks to own firearms); J. Haag, Between the Extremes:
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tralizing national power, 16 the amendment "revolutionized" the
relationship between the United States and the state governments 17 by
requiring the supremacy of federal law over areas which had tradition-
ally been the exclusive concern of state governments.s On the other
hand, some proponents wanted the amendment to be enacted to ensure
the equality of blacks and whites, as well as to transfer primary control
of certain areas of state concern over to the federal government. 19
Other proponents of the thirteenth amendment, however, argued that
the amendment was enacted solely to abolish slavery as practiced in
the Southern States. 20 Neither the opponents nor the proponents of the
thirteenth amendment, however, even attempted to define the term
"involuntary servitude."
2'
A. Legislative History of Section 1581 of the Crimes and Criminal
Procedure Code
Because slavery still existed in certain parts of the United States,
22
Congress enacted the original peonage statute in 1867, 21 which later
An Exercise in Second Amendment Jurisprudence 138-41 (May 22, 1986) (unpublished senior
honors thesis, Permanent Collection, Haines Political Science Library, University of California,
Los Angeles) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal) (discussing the present implications of the
Cruikshank case for interpretation of the second amendment).
16. Buchanan, supra note 1, at 9. See also ten Broek, Thirteenth Amendment To The
Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 CAarw. L. REv. 171, 174-76, 183 (1951).
17. C. FArRmAN, 6 HiSTORY OF Ta SuPREm COURT OF THE UNIrED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION
AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 1147 n.91, 1156 (1971).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16,
16 Stat. 144); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 27); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). The above statutes proscribe the denial of the right to enter into con-
tracts, the right to own property, the right to vote, and the right to invoke the judicial process,
all of which were traditionally regulated by state law. Id.
19. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864) (statement of Sen. Harlan,
decrying the various incidents of servitude, which denied blacks the right to intermarry, the right
to own property, and the right to redress legal wrongs in the courts).
20. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan).
21. See generally, Hamilton, supra note 13; Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 10 NAT'L. B.J. 7 (1952) (discussing peonage and involuntary
servitude history in the United States). See also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864).
Senator Howard commented:
I think it is well understood, well comprehended by the people of the United States,
and no court of justice, no magistrate, no person, old or young, can misapprehend the
meaning and effect of that comprehensive clause.
Id. See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (noting that slavery and the various badges
of servitude were well understood). Contemporary sources fail to adequately define the word
"slave;" e.g., "one deprived of freedom, a drudge." N. WEBSTER, A CoPnHENDlous DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 280 (Hartford: Hudson & Goodwin; New Haven: Increase Cooke,
1806). A slave is a "person who is held in bondage to another; one who is wholly subject to the
will of another; one who has no freedom of action." WEBSRm's COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF TIM
ENGLIm LANGUAGE 1241 (Goodrich & Porter ed. 1864).
22. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 2d. Sess. 238, 240 (1867) (statements of Sen. Sumner).
23. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546. The original peonage statute provided
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became section 1581 of the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Code.24
Reports from the Southwest Territories and documents from the Com-
mittee on Military Affairs detailed the ongoing practice of peonage in
the Territories. 25 Congress decided to prohibit the practice of peonage
after determining that, since great difficulty existed in distinguishing
voluntary from involuntary peonage, the practice should be abolished
altogether.26 Moreover, Congress decided to eliminate the practice of
peonage immediately, rather than wait for the eventual curtailment and
abolition of the practice by the Territorial courts. 27
For inexplicable reasons, in the late 1800's, the original federal
antipeonage statute was broken up into three provisions. One statute
provided the definition of peonage, and declared it null and void.2
in pertinent part:
[Tihe holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
hereby declared to be unlawful and the same is hereby abolished and forever prohibited
in the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other Territory or State of the United States;
and all ... laws ... which have heretofore established, maintained or enforced ...
the voluntary or involuntary service... of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any
debt or obligation ... are ... declared null and void, and any person ... who shall
hold ... any person to a condition of peonage, shall ... be punished by fine not less
than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not less
than one nor more than five years....
Id.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
772). The peonage statute provides that "[w]hoever holds or returns any person to a condition of
peonage or arrests any person with the intent of placing him in or returning him to a condition
of peonage, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both." Id. The accepted definition of peonage is a condition of coerced labor based upon an
alleged or real indebtedness. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1904) (setting forth
the legal definition of peonage).
25. S. Rm. No. 156, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 324 (1867). Chief Justice Kirby Benedict of the
Southwest Territory deposed that Navajos had repeatedly been bought and sold by Navajos. In
his estimation, the approximate number of peons in captivity was well over 2000 people. Id. at
326-27. See Jaremillo v. Romero, I N.M. 190, 195-97 (1857) (Benedict, C.J.) (first case discussing
this legal and social practice). Governed by intricate rules, the system of peonage was designed to
protect both master and servant. Both Mexican and Spanish Civil Law stated that the contract
was an individual one, restricted to a fixed object and a predetermined time period. Id. at 198.
The parties were required to sign and authenticate the contract. Id. at 197-98. If the peon died,
children of that peon did not have to pay the decedent's balance due or serve the master. Id. at
207. Finally, whipping was prohibited, as was the loss of political or citizenship rights during the
contractual period. Id. at 198, 207.
26. CoNG. GaoaE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (1867) (statement of Sen. Davis).
27. Id. at 1572 (statement of Sen. Buckalew).
28. "The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
abolished and forever prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other Territory or
State of the United States, and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations or usages ... which
have heretofore established, maintained or enforced ... directly or indirectly, the voluntary or
involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, are
declared null and void." Ray. STAT. § 1990, at 349 (Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat.
546).
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The second and third statutes were enforcement mechanisms, and
provided penalties for violators. 29
The legislative record reveals that some senators questioned the
necessity of retaining the involuntary servitude provisions during the
debates in 1908 over the proposed Criminal Code revision. 0 Conse-
quently, Congress never discussed the peonage provisions.3 1 Thus,
Congress simply enacted the peonage provisions as sections 269 and
270 of the new 1909 Criminal Code.
32
In 1948, Congress again examined the peonage provisions and con-
solidated sections 269 and 270 of the 1909 Criminal Code.33 Congress
made only minor changes in the phraseology of the peonage statute.
4
However, the declaratory statement prohibiting peonage was left sep-
arate from the enforcement provisions, and remains so to this day.
35
B. Legislative History of Section 1584 of the Crimes and Criminal
Procedure Code
Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an analysis of the
language of that statute, since the plain meaning of the statute will
control in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary.36 The
original statutes which section 1584 evolved into were enacted to
prohibit the enslavement of blacks. 37 With the explicit insertion of the
29. See infra note 32 (text of original antipeonage enforcement statutes, which were reenacted
without changes in the 1909 Criminal Code revision).
30. 42 CoNo. REc. 1114-22 (1908) (statements of Sen. Hale, Sen. Heyburn, and Sen. Lodge).
As a result of this debate, the Clerk of the Senate was prohibited from even reading the peonage
portions of the Criminal Code. Id. at 1114.
31. Id. at 1114.
32. Section 269 of the 1909 Criminal Code provided that: "Whoever holds, arrests, returns,
or causes to be held, arrested or returned, or in any manner aids in the arrest or return of any
person to a condition of peonage, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both." Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 269, 35 Stat. 1142 (formerly
REv.STAT. 5526, at 1071). Section 270 of the 1909 Criminal Code provided that: "Whoever
obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of
the section last preceding [section 269], shall be liable to the penalties therein prescribed." Act of
March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 270, 35 Stat. 1142 (formerly RaV. STAT. § 5527, at 1071).
33. H.R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. Al0 (1947) (comments of the Revisor).
34. Id.
35. "The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws,
resolutions, orders, regulations or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore
established... the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any person as peons, in liquidation
of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void." 42 U.S.C. 1994 (1982).
36. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (in the absence of clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary, statutory language which exhibits no ambiguity is regarded as
conclusive).
37. See infra note 54 (text of the prior antislavery statutes).
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words "any person" into the involuntary servitude statute,38 however,
the protections of the thirteenth amendment and the involuntary ser-
vitude statute were extended to all races.3 9 Also, the thirteenth amend-
ment and statutes enacted pursuant to the amendment prohibit the
enslavement of all persons, regardless of the citizenship or stateless
status of the victim.40 Section 1584 regulates purely private conduct 4'
unlike other constitutional provisions which require a showing of
governmental action.42 Finally, the involuntary servitude statute ex-
pressly provides for a requirement of mens rea.
4
1
The present involuntary servitude statute" is a consolidation of
sections 248 and 271 of the 1909 Criminal Code.45 Section 271 is
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
773). The involuntary servitude statute provides that "[w]hoever knowingly and wilfully holds to
involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person so
held, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id.
39. 42 CONG. REc. 1114 (1908) (statement of Sen. Heyburn).
40. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) (asserting that the thirteenth amendment
prohibits the existence of Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system in the United
States).
41. Legislation enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment may be direct and primary,
acting upon private acts, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not. Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
42. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent
part that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws (emphasis added)." Id.
43. See supra note 38 (text of the involuntary servitude statute, specifically, use of the words
"knowingly and wilfully"). Before 1948, a cause of action arose under the involuntary servitude
statute only if a victim was enslaved, escaped, and finally forced back into a condition of
involuntary servitude. See Brodie, supra note 2, at 369 (discussing this loophole in the wording
of the involuntary servitude statute). In 1948, however, with the revision of Title 18, the Crimes
and Criminal Procedure Code, section 1584 was changed to prohibit the initial subjugation of a
person, by the addition of the phrase "holds to a condition of involuntary servitude." See Address
by Arthur B. Caldwell, Chief, Civil Rights Section, Department of Justice, (July 16, 1953) (The
Civil Rights Section, Its Functions and Its Statutes 26, prepared for delivery before the Civil
Rights Class of the Summer Session of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)
(unpublished manuscript). See also supra note 38 (text of the involuntary servitude statute).
44. 18 U.S.C. 1584 (1982).
45. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 10, 248, 35 Stat. 1139 (1909) (formerly REv. STAT. § 5377, at
1043) (repealed 1948). Section 248 of the 1909 Criminal Code stated as follows:
Whoever brings within the jurisdiction of the United States, in any manner whatsoever,
any person from any foreign kingdom or country ... or holds, sells, or otherwise
disposes of, any person so brought in, as a slave, or to be held to service or labor,
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars ... and ... shall be imprisoned not
more than seven years.
Id. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 10, § 271, 35 Stat. 1142 (1909) (formerly Pav. STAT. § 5527,
at 1071) (repealed 1948). Section 271 of the 1909 Criminal Code stated as follows:
[Whoever shall knowingly and wilfully bring into the United States or any place
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, any person inveigled or forcibly kidnapped in any
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derived from the 1874 Padrone statute. 46 The purpose of the 1874
statute was to protect people of foreign birth against involuntary
servitude. 47 In the late 1800's, the Padrone system was prevalent in
major United States cities on the East Coast. 4 Under the Padrone
system, Italian boys were brought to the United States in violation of
Italian law49 and were forced to work as street musicians, beggars, and
bootblacks.50 In the 1874 Congress, one representative commented that
consent would be a defense to the type of involuntary servitude
prohibited by the Padrone statute if this consent was not extorted by
"duress or violence."9
51
other country, with intent to hold such person so inveigled or kidnapped in confine-
ment or to any involuntary servitude. . shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars and imprisoned not more than five years.
Id. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of involuntary servitude
set forth in United States v. Kozminsla).
46. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 464, § 1, 18 Stat. 251 (1874). The Padrone statute stated:
[W]hoever shall knowingly and wilfully bring into the United States ... any person
inveigled or forcibly kidnapped in any other country, with intent to hold such person
... in confinement or to any involuntary service, ... and whoever shall knowingly
and wilfully sell, or cause to be sold, into any condition of involuntary servitude, any
other person so sold and bought, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and ... be impri-
soned for a term not exceeding five years and pay a fine not exceeding five thousand
dollars. Id. The definition of "inveigle" means to "seduce, allure, entice, [or] wheedle";
in other words, the use of fraud or deceit. N. WEBsTER, A ColmtPDious DICIONARY
OF Tim ENGLUS LANGuAGE 164 (Hartford: Hudson & Goodwin; New Haven: Increase
Cooke, 1806). Chapter 464 (the Padrone statute) was repealed by Act of March 4,
1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat. 1153-54 (1909), and subsequently reenacted as Act
of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 271, 35 Stat. 1139 (1909).
47. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 464, § 1, 18 Star. 251. "Chap. 464. An Act to protect
persons of foreign birth against forcible constraint or involuntary servitude." Id.
48. 2 CONG. REc. 4443 (1874). The bill was "intended to prevent the practice of enslaving,
buying, selling, or using Italian children, a practice which [was] so common in the large cities of
our country." Id. (statement of Rep. Cessna).
49. Senator Sumner alleged that 5000 Italian boys were presently in a state of involuntary
servitude, and proposed that legislation be enacted to combat this practice. 2 CONG. REc. 2 (1873).
His proposal became the 1874 Padrone statute. See supra note 46 (text of the Padrone statute).
50. See 42 CoNG. RFc. 1122 (1908) (statement of Sen. Lodge, detailing the practice).
51. 2 CoNG. REc. 5373 (1874) (statement of Rep. Thurman). See generally 1 W. BLACKSToE,
Com&=Amra s *131 (1st Am. ed. 1771). The definition of duress is that the victim is in fear of
imminent loss of life or limb. Id. See also 2 CoNG. Rac. 4443 (1874). Arguably, Congress was
concerned with protecting a certain class of persons, namely, protecting children who were unable
because of their age to protect themselves from such predatory practices, and not with protecting
a certain ethnic class. Id. The government will argue before the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Kozninski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 225
(1987), that a threat to bum down a servant's house or a threat to destroy or confiscate all of
the servant's property constitutes a violation of section 1584. Brief for the United States 17-18,
United States v. Kozminski, - U.S. - (1988) (No. 86-2000). From a legal standpoint this
position is slightly incorrect. See 1 W. BtcKsoTm, COMMENTARIES *131 (1st Am. ed. 1771)
("the fear of having one's house burned, or one's goods taken away and destroyed" does not
constitute duress). Consequently, the government's position that a psychological coercion standard
"is not unduly broad and does not present vagueness concerns" is debatable. Brief for the United
States, supra, at 32. See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding that a
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The United States Constitution provided that after January 1, 1808,
Congress could prohibit the migration or importation of slaves into
the United States 52 by the exercise of the power of Congress to regulate
commerce with foreign nations. 3 In response to the newly unrestricted
power of Congress to regulate the slave trade, Congress enacted the
precursors to section 248.-4 The parent statutes of section 248 prohibited
the importation of blacks into the United States to be used as slaves.5
No further revision of the earlier antislavery statutes occurred until
Congress debated and rephrased the involuntary servitude provisions
as a part of the massive 1909 Criminal Code revision.56
During the 1908 debate over the involuntary servitude provision,
some senators questioned the propriety of promulgating "elaborate
criminal statute which contains ambiguity as to the conduct which is forbidden is unconstitutional
as a violation of due process); Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) (holding that
a statute which leaves judges and juries free to determine without any legally fixed requirements
what is and is not prohibited in a particular case is unconstitutionally vague). The government
has presented similar examples of allegedly prohibited coercion in the past. In Shackney, the
government "manfully" asserted that preventing an employee's son from achieving a much
desired admission to Yale would be enough to convict the employer of involuntary servitude.
United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 480 (2d Cir. 1964). The Second Circuit delicately
refuted this assertion by stating that in their opinion, the government's example of coercion
"was ... [not] quite what Congress had in mind" when it enacted the involuntary servitude
statute. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
53. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. Act of March 2, 1807, ch. 22, § 6, 2 Stat. 427. The original 1808 statute provided:
[1]f any person ... shall, from and after the first day of January, one thousand eight
hundred and eight, purchase or sell any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, for a
slave, or to be held to service or labour, who shall have been imported or brought
from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, . . . after the last day of December, one
thousand eight hundred and seven, knowing at the time of such purchase or sale, such
negro, mulatto, or person of colour .... such purchaser and seller shall severally forfeit
and pay for every negro ... so purchased or sold ... eight hundred dollars.
Id. Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 91, 3 Stat. 452. The statute as modified in 1818 stated as follows:
[I]f any person or persons whatsoever shall ... bring within the jurisdiction of the
United States, in any manner whatsoever, any negro, mulatto, or person of colour,
from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, or from sea, or shall hold, sell or
otherwise dispose of, any such negro, mulatto, or person of colour, so brought in, as
a slave, or to be held to service or labour, .. . [such person or persons] shall, on
conviction thereof by due course of law, forfeit and pay, for every such offence, a sum
not exceeding ten thousand nor less than one thousand dollars ... and .. . shall suffer
imprisonment, for a term not exceeding seven years nor less than three years.
Id. For chronological reasons the argument that any of the predecessors of section 1584 (enacted
in 1808 and 1818) were passed under the power of Congress as embodied in section two of the
thirteenth amendment (enacted in 1865) is untenable. There are indications, however, that the
involuntary servitude and peonage provisions in the 1909 Criminal Code were enacted under the
thirteenth amendment. See, e.g., 42 CoNo. REc. 1115-16 (1908) (statements of Sen. Bailey and of
Sen. Heyburn). Consequently, ascertaining the intent of the 60th Congress becomes even more
imperative.
55. See supra note 54 (text of the original antislavery statutes).
56. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (Congressional debates over the involuntary
servitude statute).
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provisions" prohibiting slavery.57 Senator Heyburn58 stressed the neces-
sity of not only retaining the relevant antislavery provisions, but of
broadening the scope of these provisions to protect all persons, 59 not
just "negroes, mulattos, or persons of color." 6 More importantly,
Senator Heyburn informed his colleagues that the proposed statute was
intended to protect certain nonracial classifications of persons including
immigrants, children, and those who could not protect themselves. 61
Furthermore, Senator Heyburn suggested that the proposed statutes62
required an examination of the types of coercion used to enslave
people.,3 Other senators, however, suggested that the statutes required
57. See, e.g., 42 CONG. REc. 1114-15 (1908) (statements of Sen. Hale and of Sen. Bailey).
The senators who made such comments were of the erroneous belief that slavery had "disappeared
absolutely into the dead past," thus the antislavery statutes were no longer necessary. Id. at 1114
(statement of Sen. Hale).
58. Great weight should be accorded to the statements of Senator Heyburn, since he was the
Senatorial Head of the Joint Conference Committee and manager of the bill for the revision of
the entire Criminal Code. See 42 CONG. REc. 1114 (1908) (statement of Sen. Hale).
59. 42 CONG. REc. 1114 (1908) (statement of Sen. Heyburn).
60. 42 CoNG. RIc. 3598 (1909) (statement of Sen. Heyburn). After certain senators requested
that amendments and revisions from the joint conference committee be read in their entirety,
Senator Heyburn angrily accused a minority of the Senate of attempting to abrogate all civil rights
legislation by means of procedural delaying tactics. Id.
61. 42 CONG. Rac. 1115 (1908) (statement of Sen. Heyburn). Senator Heybum stated in part
that the proposed statutes would:
enable the law to reach those who come here without being a party to the disposition
of their services or the control of their rights whether they be children of irresponsible
years and conditions or whether they be people who, because of their environment or
the conditions of their lives, cannot protect themselves....
Id. (emphasis added).
62. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 10, § 248, 35 Stat. 1139 (1909) (formerly Rav. STAT. §
5377, at 1043). Section 248 of the 1909 Criminal Code was enacted as follows:
Whoever brings within the jurisdiction of the United States, in any manner whatsoever,
any person from any foreign kingdom or country ... or holds, sell, or otherwise
disposes of, any person so brought in, as a slave, or to be held to service or labor,
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars.. . and ... shall be imprisoned not
more than seven years.
Id. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 10, § 271, 35 Stat. 1142 (1909) (formerly REv. STAT. § 5527,
at 1071). Section 271 of the 1909 Criminal Code was enacted as follows:
Whoever shall knowingly and willfully bring into the United States or any place subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, any person inveigled or forcibly kidnapped in any other
country, with intent to hold such person so inveigled or kidnapped in confinement or
to any involuntary servitude ... shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars
and imprisoned not more than five years.
Id.
63. Id. Senator Heybum commented that the proposed involuntary servitude statutes "dealt
not with the holding of slaves within any place over which the United States exercised jurisdiction,
but it dealt -with the process by which persons were enslaved." Id. (emphasis added) Senator
Heyburn also stated that the word slavery was not coined to apply solely to antebellum conditions.
Id. at 1116. The Senator, however, also mentioned that slavery "was older than the foundations
of this country," thus suggesting that his concern was targeted at more traditional manifestations
of slavery. Id. See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 39 (1872) (noting that the word
"involuntary servitude" was inserted to prohibit serfdom and vassalage which the word "slavery"
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
an inquiry into the effect of coercion on the victim, as opposed to
requiring the government to prove that the defendant utilized certain
types of coercion against the victim.64
The most recent revision of the involuntary servitude statute was in
1948. The prior 1909 statutes, sections 248 and 271 were consolidated
into one.6 The result was that contrary to the statements of the Revisor
of the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code,66 the intent of the 1909
Congress was slightly changed. 67 By proscribing the "holding" of
another to involuntary servitude, 4 Congress arguably abolished the
notion that involuntary servitude exists only where a victim has been
forced back into slavery after escaping. 69 The new version prohibits the
initial holding of a person in a state of involuntary servitude.70 In
summary, therefore, the 1948 revision of the Crimes and Criminal
Procedure Code substantially retains the intent and scope of prior
antislavery statutes.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PEONAGE AND INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE STATUTES
There are four definitions for involuntary servitude that have devel-
oped in the federal courts. First, involuntary servitude is defined as
the use of physical force, or threats of force or legal process to compel
might not cover). Senator Heyburn's interpretation of the statutes seems to have been supported
by his colleagues, since other senators equated slavery with "bondage." 42 CoNG. REc. 1119
(1908) (statement of Sen. Stone). See N. WVEmSM, A CoiPmmDious DIcTiONARY OF THE ENoUSH
LANGuAGE 33 (Hartford: Hudson & Goodwin; New Haven: Increase Cooke, 1806). Bondage is
defined as "slavery, captivity, [or] imprisonment," thus indicating that the use of both physical
force or legal incarceration was sought to be prohibited. Id. Senator Lodge commented that no
justification for abolishing such statutes existed merely because the thirteenth amendment abolished
slavery. 42 CoNG. REc. 1122 (1908). He reminded his colleagues of the Padrone system, where
Italian boys were imported and forced to do menial labor, a condition of "practical slavery." Id.
64. 42 CoNG. REc. 1114 (1908) (statement of Sen. Heyburn). But see Folsom, A Slave Trade
Law in a Contemporary Setting, 29 CoRNmn L.Q. 203, 215 (1944) (suggesting that this assertion
which argued that the effect of coercion on the victim as dispositive was instead an attempt to
rebut the arguments of senators who believed that the involuntary servitude and peonage provisions
were obsolete).
65. See supra note 62 (text of sections 248 and 271 of the 1909 Criminal Code).
66. Although the new Crimes and Criminal Procedure Code was enacted into positive law,
both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Revisor stated that their task was merely to
consolidate the two statutes, while preserving the original scope of the statute. S. Rep. No. 1620,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948).
67. Brief for the United States, supra note 51, at 27.
68. See Address by Arthur B. Caldwell, supra note 43.
69. See supra note 62 (text of sections 248 and 271 of the 1909 Criminal Code).
70. Id.
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a person to perform labor1.7  Second, involuntary servitude is defined
as psychological coercion to force the victim to work.7 2 A third
definition of involuntary servitude requires either a showing of fraud
or deceit used against certain persons, or use of physical force or threat
of legal process to compel a person to enter a state of involuntary
servitude. 73 A final definition of involuntary servitude states that the
techniques utilized to effectuate labor are irrelevant, where the result
of the coercion is to force a victim to become a slave.
74
A. The Use of Force or Threat of Legal Process
For the first time, in United States v. Shackney,75 a court defined
involuntary servitude as the use of physical force, or threats of force
or law to compel service.76 In Shackney, the defendant hired three
Mexican families to work on his chicken farm.77 One family, the Oros,
agreed to a seven day workweek.78 The defendant paid for visas and
transportation costs to the United States.79 Mr. Oros signed promissory
notes to repay these expenses.80 The defendants were subsequently
indicted and convicted for violating the involuntary servitude and
peonage statutes."'
At trial, the Oros testified as to the following: The money they
earned was used to pay off the promissory notes, their children were
71. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (l1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1022 (1986); United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983);
United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475
(2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. 1391 (W.D. Mich. 1986), argued, No. 87-
1040, 87-1041, 87-1042, 87-1072, 87-1073, 87-1074 (6th Cir. 1987) (docket numbers of the several
consolidated cases that have been argued before the Sixth Circuit); United States v. Ingalls, 73 F.
Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
72. See United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Kozniinski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 225 (1987); Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (D.C.M.D. Ala. 1903); United States v. Ancarola,
1 F. 676 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880). The specific classes protected are immigrants, children, and mental
incompetents. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1192.
74. See, e.g., Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1904); United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d
1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917),
cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
75. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
76. See generally Folsom, supra note 64 (suggesting in 1943 that such a conflict in defining
involuntary servitude might arise in the future).
77. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 477.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 477-78.
81. Id. at 476.
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not allowed to attend school, their mail was censored by the Shackneys,
and the defendant threatened to deport the Oros family if they refused
to work. 2 The Oros admitted that Mr. Shackney never used force or
threats of force against them.33 The Oros further testified that they did
not leave the chicken farm because they were afraid that they would
be deported.'
The Second Circuit reasoned that the meaning of "servitude" as
stated in section 1584 of the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Code had
a broader meaning than "slavery" as used in early antislavery statutes. 85
The court examined United States Supreme Court cases relating to civil
rights matters in general.86 The court then concluded that the intent of
Congress was to abolish incidents of slavery such as the use of legal
process to either capture the fugitive or subject him to criminal
penalties.Y
The Shackney court held that involuntary servitude in an employment
relationship existed when the employee was prohibited from leaving
employment by "superior and overpowering force" perpetrated by the
82. Id. at 477-79.
83. Id. at 479. Because the Shackneys left the Oros to undertake teaching duties at a nearby
town, the Oros had ample opportunity to leave the chicken farm. Id.
84. Id. at 477-79.
85. Id. at 485 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1873)) ("involuntary servitude"
is broader than the word "slavery" since the latter phrase might not cover other manifestations
of the practice such as the apprenticeship system in the West Indies, or serfdom). See Public
General Acts, An Act for the Abolition of Slavery, supra note 1 (English statute abolishing slavery
created three classes of apprenticed laborers in the Colonies, one of which was the West Indies);
see supra note 54 (for text of 1808 and 1818 antislavery statutes). See also Shelby, The Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments% 3 So. L. REv. 524, 531 (1874). Even contemporaries of the Civil
War Amendments who advocated retention of miscegenation statutes freely conceded that the
word servitude was broader than slavery, and encompassed incidents of Mexican peonage and the
Chinese coolie labor system. Id. The Shackney court did not examine the complete legislative
history of section 1584, citing as justification that this statute had been enacted into "positive
law." Shackney, 333 F.2d at 482. See BLACK's LAw DicnONARY 1046 (5th ed. 1979) (defining
positive law as law specifically enacted by proper authority for the ordering of a society). See also
H. BLAcc, HAmDBOOK oN Tan CoNsTRUcTioN AND INTERPRETATiON OF rn LAws 299 (2d ed.
1911) (the reenactment of a statute following judicial construction of that statute enacts the
construction as part of the statute, since a presumption arises that the legislature was aware of
the prior construction and would have changed the law if it desired to alter the prior judicial
interpretation).
86. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 485 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1873); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916)).
87. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 485-86. As an example, the court noted that prior to the Civil
War state statutes permitted the capturing of fugitive slaves and the imposition of fines on captured
slaves. Id. But cf- Jones v. Alfred Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that Congress intended
to prohibit not only badges of servitude under color of state law, but also purely private conduct
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866). But see C. FAwmuN, supra note 17, at 1219 (criticizing Jones
on grounds that by removing section 1 of the original draft of the 1866 Act which contained a
general prohibition against discrimination, Congress was concerned only with those incidents of
slavery which arose under color of state law or custom, not with purely private discrimination).
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employer. 88 According to the court, involuntary servitude does not
result when an employee has a choice between freedom and continued
servitude, even if the consequences of terminating the employment
relationship might be "exceedingly bad," as long as the use of force
or legal process which would result in incarceration of the victim was
not in existence.89 Accordingly, the defendants could not be convicted
of involuntary servitude since a threat of deportation still left the Oros
with a choice between continued service and freedom.9" Under Shackney,
therefore, involuntary servitude results when service is compelled by
force, or the threat of force or legal process. 9'
88. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 486 (citing Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 34 (1906) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
89. Id. at 486.
90. Id. The court made clear that while a credible threat of depbrtation might come "close
to the line" of being involuntary servitude, the threat could not be equated with a credible threat
of imprisonment. Id. The Shackney court was concerned that if section 1584 would be interpreted
to cover more situations than just the use of force or legal process, employees would use the
statute as a tool of blackmail against their employers. Id. at 486-87. Consequently, a more
expansive interpretation might unduly infringe upon the negotiating process between labor and
management, thus undermining the foundations of capitalism, specifically, a system of "completely
free and voluntary labor." See Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). The Supreme Court
in Pollack stated that where coercion is present, an employee lacks the power to redress grievances
and the employer has no incentive to alleviate egregious working conditions. Id. at 18.
91. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 487. A more recent case dealt with the use of physical force to
coerce labor in the context of religious cults. See United States v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. 1391 (W.D.
Mich. 1986), argued, No. 87-1040i 87-1041, 87-1042, 87-1072, 87-1073, 87-1074 (6th Cir. 1987).
In Lewis, one defendant was the spiritual leader of a cult, which taught that corporal punishment
was necessary to ensure that cult members follow the teachings of the Bible, as interpreted by the
defendant. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. at 1399. Approximately 100 cult members stayed at a camp
patrolled by other members carrying firearms. Id. The detained members were prohibited from
leaving the camp unaccompanied, and their mail was censored. Id. In March of 1982, the leader
of the cult required all adult members to give his lieutenants permission to inflict punishment on
their children. Id. at 1396. Punishment in the form of whippings, beatings, burning, and stoning
were inflicted on many children, and one child died as a result of the punishments. Id. The "sins"
perpetrated by the children consisted primarily of failing to properly follow work orders. Id. At
trial, the children testified that they did not leave the camp because they feared further punishment.
Id. The court held that since the evidence established that the children were compelled to work
by means of physical torture, the defendants had placed the victims into a state of involuntary
servitude. Id. at 1398, 1401. In Lewis, the parents did not protect their children, but instead
consented to the acts of physical violence. Id. at 1396, 1403. Because of the severity of the
punishments involved, however, the court held that the state could interfere and protect the
children where the parents had refused. Id. at 1403. In other words, since "[these] children of
irresponsible years ... [could] not protect themselves," the protections of the law extended to
this nonracial classification of persons. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (statement of
Sen. Heyburn). The only issue presently before the Sixth Circuit in this case is whether the parental
consent given was valid, given the religious context and the violence involved. Telephone interview
with Irving L. Gornstein, Attorney, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division, United States
Department of Justice (Dec. 17, 1987) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal); Telephone
Interview with Mr. Albert Glenn, Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department
of Justice (Sept. 18, 1987) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal). See also Turner v. Unification
Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978), affd, 602 F.2d 458 (1979). In Turner, the plaintiff
alleged that disciples of the defendant brainwashed and forced the plaintiff to work long hours
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In the concurring opinion in Shackney, Judge Dimock disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of section 1584. He argued that the
victim's state of mind should be the focus of an involuntary servitude
prosecution, not the means by which the servitude was imposed.93 If
the actions of the defendant caused the victim to believe that a state
of involuntary servitude resulted, a cause of action under section 1584
would arise.Y
The Fourth Circuit dealt with conditions of involuntary servitude in
the agricultural industry in United States v. Harris.95 The defendants
in Harris supervised migrant farm workers.9 The government alleged
in this section 1584 prosecution that the defendants subjected farm
workers to a state of involuntary servitude by means of physical acts
of violence.9 Many of the workers were recruited by either deceit or
actual kidnapping. 9 The workers were charged high prices for their
meals and were guarded and confined for attempting to escape. 99 One
farm worker died of heatstroke after being overworked in the fields. 'o
The Harris court did not provide a concrete definition of involuntary
servitude. 1 1 The court reasoned that an interpretation of section 1584
should take into account "Twentieth Century" manifestations of slav-
ery.I°2 According to the court, the threats and use of physical confine-
ment by the defendants constituted sufficient evidence for a finding of
involuntary servitude. 103
for no pay. Id. at 371. The court dismissed all causes of action, in part because of the status of
the defendant. Id. at 378. See also Lucksted & Martell, Cults: A Conflict Between Religious
Liberty and Involuntary Servitude, 51 FBI L. ENF. BuLL. 16 (April 1982); 51 FBI L. Enf. Bull.
16 (May 1982); 51 FBI L. Enf. Bull. 16 (June 1982) (discussing Turner and the first amendment
implications of certain involuntary servitude prosecutions).
92. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 487 (Dimock, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 488. But see Note, Involuntary Servitude: Modem Conditions Addressed In United
States v. Mussy, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 153, 172 (1984) (arguing that a victim might rationally
choose a condition of involuntary servitude over other available options).
95. 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983).
96. Harris, 701 F.2d at 1098.
97. Id. at 1098. Specifically, the defendants first recruited the victims, and then deducted
living expenses from workers' wages, guarded workers at night, picked up "escapees," and





101. Id. at 1100.
102. Id. (quoting United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981)). The Harris court
did not define exactly what "Twentieth Century" manifestations of slavery are, But see supra
note 2 (statistics listing involuntary servitude complaints for the past three and one-quarter fiscal
years).
103. Harris, 701 F.2d at 1100. A similar case, United States v. Booker, applied the Shackney
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In United States v. Ingalls,10 a case involving threats of legal process,
a servant performed household labor in exchange for poor living
quarters, substandard food, and no vacations or monetary compensa-
tion for a period of twenty-five years. 05 The servant was also physically
abused by the defendants.30 Mrs. Ingalls applied coercion by threat-
ening to reveal to the authorities the servant's prior adulterous rela-
tionship with Mrs. Ingalls' first husband.'0 Mrs. Ingalls also threatened
to disclose the fact that an abortion was obtained as a result of that
relationship.t0
According to California law in 1947, both adultery and procuring
an abortion were punishable by prison terms and fines. 109 After escap-
test, which interpreted section 1584, to a cause of action arising under section 1583. United States
v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 564 (4th Cir. 1981). See 18 U.S.C. § 1583 (1982). The kidnapping statute
provides as follows:
whoever kidnaps or carries away any other person, with the intent that such other
person be sold into involuntary servitude, or held as a slave ... shall be fined not
more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. In Booker, the defendant withheld all wages, required all purchases to be made at the camp,
and threatened to seriously injure or kill farm workers if the workers left the camp before any
alleged debts were satisfied. Booker, 655 F.2d at 563. After attempting to leave, two victims were
choked, beaten with axe handles, and warned that more physical abuse or death would be
forthcoming if another attempt to leave was initiated before the alleged debts were paid. Id. at
563-64. The court defined a slave as "a person who is wholly subject to the will of another, one
who has no freedom of action and whose person and services are wholly under the control of
another." Id. at 566 (citing United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76, 78 (S.D. Cal. 1947)). See
infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Ingalls case). Because of the physical
violence involved, the court did not have to reach the issue of whether other forms of coercion
might be actionable under section 1583, thus leaving the phrase "wholly subject to the will of
another" ambiguous. Booker, 655 F.2d at 566. The court merely stated that the acts of physical
violence perpetrated by the defendant were enough to place the victim in a state of involuntary
servitude as defined by the Shackney court. Id. at 566-67. As in the Harris case, United States v.
Warren involved the recurrent problem of slavery in migrant agricultural labor camps. United
States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 830 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986). The
defendants originally recruited the victims under the false pretext of offering them work and
eventually transported them against their will to Florida. Id. at 830-31. The defendants told the
victims that they owed money for the food provided by the defendants. Id. at 830. After working
for 45 days, one victim had received no pay and only one meal per day. Id. at 831. Furthermore,
workers were beaten for complaining about the lack of pay. Id. The migrant farm workers were
repeatedly warned not to attempt to escape, otherwise they would be "whooped." Id. at 830.
Since the case of the government focused on the use of physical force to compel labor, the Warren
court did not define the term "involuntary servitude." Id. at 833. Nevertheless, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that the use of physical violence was the "most grotesque example" of coercion.
Id. at 833-34. This dictum arguably hints that less egregious facts might make the evidentiary
determination a more difficult one.
104. 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).




109. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 275 (West 1987 Supp.) This statute, which was originally enacted
in 1872, states that the solicitation or procurement of an abortion by a woman is punishable by
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ing, the servant went to the Berkeley, California police station." 0 While
the servant was at the police station, the defendant arrived and repeated,
to the victim, the threats to have the victim incarcerated."' Because
she feared that the threats would be carried out, the servant left the
police station in the custody of the defendant.12 Arguably, therefore,
Ingalls stands for the proposition that the use of legal process, through
the mechanism of abortion and adultery statutes, sufficed to place the
victim into a condition of involuntary servitude.
According to commentators, the Ingalls court expanded the legal
definition of involuntary servitude to include psychological coercion,
by focusing on the poor working conditions and physical abuse
perpetrated by the defendants.' If the defendants in Ingalls initially
held the servant to a state of involuntary servitude," 4 the existing
statute precluded prosecution, because the initial confinement of a
person did not constitute involuntary servitude.'"5 Only with the ad-
dition of the word "holding" by Congress to section 1584 one year
later, was the initial confinement of a person through coercive means
made illegal.1 6 Thus, the Ingalls court merely applied the language
of the statute to the facts of the case, the servant escaping and then
being forced back into a state of involuntary servitude, and did not
imprisonment in the state prison. Id. See also 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 71, §§ 5, 6, at 133 (repealing CAL.
PENAL CoDE § 269(a) (West 1955)) (stating that cohabitation and adultery are punishable by a fine
not exceeding one thousand dollars or imprisonment not to exceed one year).
110. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. at 77-78.
111. Id. at 78.
112. Id. In other words, the victim exercised a choice between continued servitude to the
defendant by means of the threats of incarceration, as opposed to being incarcerated by the state
upon conviction of the abortion and adultery charges, if the defendant informed the authorities.
Such a "choice" is in contrast to the mere threat of deportation in Shackney. See United States
v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964). See also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133,
146 (1914) (noting that coercion resulting from constant fear of imprisonment under the criminal
laws renders the work compulsory in the same fashion as arresting the victim).
113. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 51, at 29 n.16. The government will
argue before the United States Supreme Court that the Ingalls case "involved facts strikingly like
those present" in United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 225 (1987), by extensively listing the harsh working conditions under which the victim
labored. Brief for the United States, supra note 51, at 29 n.16. In the appellate brief, however,
the fact is conspicuously omitted that the victim in Ingalls was also working under threat of legal
process, specifically, statutes which prohibited a woman from procuring an abortion. Ingalls, 73
F. Supp. at 77. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (anti-abortion and adultery statutes in
force in California during 1947). Nowhere in the Sixth Circuit opinion in Kozminski is there
mentioned the fact that the victims were placed into a state of involuntary servitude by means of
the threat of incarceration presented by state statutes.
114. As opposed to the servant escaping and being subsequently forced back into slavery.
115. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing the addition of the word
"holding" to section 1584 in 1948 and the Ingalls case).
116. Id.
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change the definition of section 1584. Moreover, the primary type
of coercion used against the victim was the threat of legal process,
not the totality of the circumstances as argued by some commentators.
The above cases suggest that the government must prove that coercion
resulted in an actual denial of liberty. The types of coercion used such
as physical force or the threat of legal process evidences such a denial
of liberty. Moreover, one case, United States v. Ingalls, is a legal
process case rather than a psychological coercion case, as the govern-
ment has impliedly asserted. 117 A more recent case has attempted to
expand the definition of involuntary servitude to include coercion by
psychological means." 8
B. Use of Psychological Coercion
In United States v. Mussry,"9 the government alleged that the
defendants illegally brought Indonesian workers to Los Angeles and
forced them to work fifteen hours per day. m The workers were required
to cook, clean, and do landscaping and gardening tasks.'2 ' The servants
lived in the homes of the defendants.'22 The Indonesians lacked edu-
cation, job skills, and familiarity with the English language.'2 The
government sought to prove that the defendants used their knowledge
of Indonesian culture to psychologically coerce the workers to accede
to these substandard working conditions. 4 If the workers did not
reimburse the defendants for the cost of the airline fare which brought
117. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 51, at 29 n.16.
118. See United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855
(1984).
119. 726 F.2d at 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984). The defendants in
Mussry were prosecuted under sections 1581, 1583, and 1584 of the Crimes and Criminal Procedure
Code. Id. See supra notes 24, 35, 38, 103 (text of the involuntary servitude, peonage, and
kidnapping statutes).
120. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1451. No vacation breaks were permitted, and the compensation of
the workers was far below the minimum wage. Id.
121. Id. at 1450.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1453.
124. Id. at 1453-54. Apparently, the defendants were aware that Indonesian provincial laws
required all citizens to possess an identification card at all times. See Note, supra note 94, at 76
(citing page 12 of the Appellate Brief for the United States in the Mussry case). Anyone not in
possession of an identification card was subject to arrest. Id. Such laws were enforced more
rigorously against those Indonesian citizens who were not residents of a town they were passing
through. Id. Moreover, the defendants encouraged the belief that failure to carry an identification
card or passport in the United States would lead to the arrest of the servants. Id. After this
psychological coercion standard was handed down, a jury convicted the four defendants in Mussry.
Three of the defendants were sentenced to probation and the payment of fines and restitution to
the victims. See 1985 AnT'Y GEM. ANN. REP. 165. (citing United States v. Mussry, CR. No. 82-802-
RG (C.D. Cal.)).
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them to the United States,'21 the defendants threatened to not return
the workers' airline tickets and passports.'2
According to the court, modem manifestations of involuntary ser-
vitude usually involve the enslavement of migrant farm workers or
domestic servants.' 21 Moreover, modem victims could be Hispanic,
Asian, or members of another racial classification other than black. 28
The court stated that the Shackney test was too circumscribed to fully
implement the purpose of the thirteenth amendment and the enforcing
statutes. 29 According to the court, section 1584 prohibits a defendant
from coercing a victim to work through wrongful or improper conduct
which is intended to cause the victim to believe they have no alternative
but to perform. 30 Because the court did not describe the types of
wrongful conduct prohibited by section 1584,131 the standard to apply
in cases involving involuntary servitude is unclear. Nevertheless, scholars
interpret the Mussry test as requiring a showing of psychological
coercion to convict a defendant of the crime of involuntary servitude,
even where there is an absence of physical force or threats of legal
process perpetrated against the victim. 32
125. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1451.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1450. See supra note 2 (statistics on types of involuntary servitude complaints and
prosecutions). See 1985 Arr'Y Gm. ANN. RaP. 165, 170 n.15 (citing United States v. Kimes &
Kimes, CR No. LV 85-134 (D. Nev.)). Kimes included charges filed by the government against
two wealthy homeowners who recruited illegal aliens to perform domestic work in their homes in
Hawaii, California, and Nevada. The victims were misled as to working conditions and subjected
to physical abuse. Id.
128. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1451. The court hastened to add that under certain circumstances,
caucasians might become victims of slavery. Id. at 1451 n.4. The statutory history of section 1584,
however, implies that Congress intended to protect nonracial classes of persons. See supra notes
36-70 and accompanying text (detailing the legislative history of section 1584). Moreover, the use
of racial classifications to evidence a condition of involuntary servitude is evidently an unworkable
definition when an appellate court concedes that members of all races can be forced into a
condition of involuntary servitude.
129. Id. See supra notes 1, 24, 35, 38, 103 (text of the thirteenth amendment and enforcing
statutes). The court cited Judge Dimock's concurring opinion in Shackney, which argued that the
meaning of the word "involuntary" necessarily meant the only determination necessary is whether
the will of the servitor has been subjugated. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1452 (citing United States v.
Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1964)).
130. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453.
131. Id. As an example of a permissible use of coercion, the court pointed out that an
employer who either truthfully notified the employee that no other jobs existed in the market, or
offered low wages, or took advantage of circumstances created by others was not guilty of
involuntary servitude. Id.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 225 (1987). Even thotigh the government had presented the interpretation of psychological
coercion as early as Shackney, no appellate court had adopted such a test until the decision of
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Mussry. See Shapiro, Involuntary Servitude: The Need for
A More Flexible Approach, 19 RuTGErs L. REV. 65, 67 n.12 (1964) (citing page 17 of the
Appellate Brief for the United States in the Shackney case).
1988 / Involuntary Seritude
C. Use of Fraud, Deceit, Force, or Legal Process to Compel Service
The most recent definition of involuntary servitude not only adheres
to the intent of Congress, but also takes account of cases which
interpreted prior antislavery statutes only a few years after those statutes
were enacted. The new definition takes judicial notice of prior attempts
by courts to protect persons the law considers incapable of protect-
ing themselves from involuntary servitude imposed by fraud or deceit.
For example, in United States v. Ancarola,33 a case which interpreted
the Padrone statute only six years after it was enacted, Italian boys
were purchased by the defendant. 3 ' The defendant promised to teach
them music, take them to America, and allow them to work as street
musicians for approximately four years.'" The defendant further prom-
ised to send the resulting wages from the labors of the boys to their
parents. 136
The defendant took the boys to London, and then to New York. 137
A depot superintendent in New York prohibited the boys from contin-
uing on their journey with the defendant because he suspected that the
boys were not related to the defendant. 138 Six days later the defendant
was arrested'39 and charged with bringing into the United States chil-
dren, having inveigled them in Italy, with intent to keep the boys in a
state of involuntary servitude. 140
The Ancarola court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial,
holding that the consent given by the boys was of no legal consequence
because of their age.' 4' Specifically, the court found that the boys'
consent was a "sham" since their age made them susceptible to being
enticed into a condition of involuntary servitude by fraud or deceit. 42
According to the court, the fraud perpetrdted against the Italian boys
was a clear violation of the 1874 Padrone statute. 43
133. 1 F. 676 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
134. Ancarola, 1 F. at 678, 683.
135. Id. at 678-80.
136. Id. at 680, 687.
137. Id. at 679.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 677. The defendant was convicted by a jury and motioned for a new trial. Id.
141. Id. at 683.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 676, 683. The rationale of the Ancarola court can arguably be construed as a
concern by the court for the immaturity of the victims and, to a lesser extent, their ethnicity. But
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Ancarola and the Peonage Cases'" are the genesis of a partial
definition of involuntary servitude based on the type of coercion
involved and whether the victim was a member of a nonracial classi-
fication, namely, children or the mentally retarded. The most recent
judicial treatment of the crime of involuntary servitude has recognized
the importance of these two cases. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals implicitly combined the concern for mental incompetents
found in the Peonage Cases with the express concern for the welfare
of minors as evidenced in Ancarola, in a novel definition of involuntary
servitude.1 45
In United States v. Kozminski, 46 a dairy farmer, his wife and son
were convicted under section 1584 for the involuntary servitude of two
mentally retarded farm workers. The victims had very low intelligence
quotients,147 and both agreed to work on the defendants' dairy farm
in exchange for food and living quarters. 4
At trial, government witnesses testified that the victims' lodging was
filthy and lacked running water. 49 The victims were provided only
maggot-infested food. 50 The witnesses also testified that at various
times the victims were slapped, kicked, and choked by Mr. Kozmin-
ski."' On occasion the victims would "sneak" away from the defen-
see Note, supra note 94, at 159 (suggesting that the case is unclear as to whether the types of
coercion used were irrelevant, or whether the focus was in reality on the victims' immaturity). See
also E. FARNswoRTr, CoNTrrcTs § 4.3 (1982) (minors lack the capacity to contract); United States
v. Kozminski 821 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, United States v. Kozminski,
108 S. Ct. 225 (1987) (noting that the law of contract does not recognize that a minor possesses
the legal capacity to enter into contracts).
144. 123 F. 671 (D.C.M.D. Ala. 1903). Added insight into a partial definition of involuntary
servitude can also be seen in the Peonage Cases. In response to questions posed by a grand jury
contemplating the indictment of certain persons, one portion of the judge's answer focused on
protecting a victim who possessed certain mental deficiencies. Id. at 682. Specifically, the grand
jury was instructed to indict the defendant if they found that a judge colluded with the defendant
to induce the victim, "being of weak mind, or of little intelligence," to work off a nonexistent
fine levied against the victim by the judge and paid by the defendant in exchange for the victim's
freedom from incarceration. Id. Eighteen indictments were later handed down. See Schmidt,
Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era; Part 2: The Peonage
Cases, 82 CAUF. L. REv. 646, 666-67 (1982) (citing P. DANIE, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE
iN THE SouTm, 1901-1969 52, 54-55, 57 (1972)). Two defendants pleaded guilty, one trial ended
in a conviction, and one ended in a hung jury. Id.
145. United States v. Kozminski 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, United
States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987).
146. 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987).
147. One victim possessed an intelligence quotient of 60 and the other victim was found to




151. Id. at 1189.
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dants to see friends or family members.'52 The defendants always
brought the victims back and discouraged them from leaving again.
153
The victims were also instructed not to converse with visitors.' 4
A panel of the Kozminski court affirmed the defendants' convic-
tions, 155 but the court sitting en banc, while declining to grant a
judgment of acquittal, disapproved of the panel's reasoning. 15 6 By
examining the legislative history of the 1874 Padrone statute,15 7 the
court sitting en banc determined that the drafters intended not only to
prohibit force and threats of force to compel involuntary servitude,
but also intended to combat the evils of compelling the services of
persons incapable of giving legally valid consent.'58 Taking judicial
notice of applicable precedent, the court held that involuntary servitude
occurs when an individual believes that no viable alternative exists
other than to perform because of the threat or use of physical force
or legal process. 9 The court also held that the use of fraud or deceit
to procure labor from a minor, an immigrant, or a mental incompetent
constituted involuntary servitude. 6I
The court disapproved of the overbroad definition of involuntary
servitude articulated in United States v. Mussry.161 The Kozminski court
criticized the Mussry decision, since it criminalized all forms of psy-
chological coercion without the presence of deceit, fraud, threats of
force, or legal coercion, perpetrated against "particularly vulnerable"
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Witnesses also testified that the defendants mentioned to neighbors and visitors
that the victims were wards of the state and were in their custody. Id. The Kozminskis were
fully aware of the fact that the men had limited mental abilities. See Brief for the United
States, supra note 51, at 8.
155. United States v. Kozminski, No. 84-1228 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, United
States v. Kozrninski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. granted, United States
v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987). See also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Kozminski, 72a, 79a (June 15,
1986, United States Supreme Court) (contains full text of the unreported panel decision).
156. United States v. Kozminski 821 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, United States v. Kozminski, No. 84-1228 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, United States v.
Kozminsld, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987).
157. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 190-93. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing
the meaning of the Padrone statute, as evidenced by senators' statements).
158. Kozninski, 821 F.2d at 1191.
159. Id. at 1192.
160. Id. The court held that in order to prove that this test is satisfied, the government must
establish that the victim was under a disability to recognize or resist fraud or deceit because of
the victim's vulnerability as a member of one of the specific classes mentioned above. Id.
161. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1193 (citing United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984)). See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text (discussing the
Mussry decision).
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victims. 62 The Kozminski court then disapproved of the use of a
general psychological coercion jury instruction by the trial court and
remanded the case for a new trial on additional grounds. 63 In declining
to order a judgment of acquittal, however, the court surmised that the
jury might have found the victims to be mentally incompetent and that
the defendants practiced deceit and fraud upon them in order to procure
their services. 164
The Kozminski definition of involuntary servitude covers situations
of either certain types of coercion or certain nonracial classifications
of persons. Furthermore, the Kozminski test precludes convictions
where, for example, the victim does not possess great educational or
cultural disabilities. 16 However, the inclusion of immigrants in the
Kozminski test apparently constitutes dictum, as no facts in the case
suggest that the victims were immigrants:
D. Results-Oriented Test for Involuntary Servitude
A minority of courts look favorably upon a test which examines
only the effect of coercion perpetrated against the victim.'" In Bernal
162. Id.
163. Id. The Kozminski court concluded that expert testimony relating to the victims' experi-
encing a type of "captivity" syndrome arising from prolonged physical captivity was inappropriate,
since no evidence was presented which suggested that the victims were placed in a state of actual
captivity, unlike, for example, prisoners of war. Id. at 1194-95. See United States v. Green, 548
F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977) (requiring that expert testimony must be in conformity with a
generally accepted explanatory theory). In a concurring opinion, Judge Cornelia Kennedy took
exception to the majority's use of a subjective standard of involuntariness. Kozminski, 821 F.2d
at 1198 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Judge Kennedy stated that a jury should determine whether
the intent of the defendant evidenced through the defendant's conduct caused the victim to remain
in a state of involuntary servitude. Id. The concurring opinion of Judge Kennedy implied that the
problem of involuntary servitude is fundamentally an evidentiary one. Id. Judge Wellford, also
concurring, expressed a desire to adhere to a definition which would be met if a certain amount
of coercion had resulted. Id. (vellford, J., concurring). The dissent argued that the new fraud/
deceit prong focused only on some means (to the exclusion of other means) used to enslave people.
Id. at 1212 (Guy, J., Lively C.J., Martin, J., and Jones, J., dissenting). Noting that the Padrone
statute used the words "any person," the dissenters asserted that nonimmigrants were entitled to
the benefits of the statute. Id. Consequently, Judge Dimock's concurring opinion in United States
v. Shackney was more desirable than the majority's holding. Id. See supra, notes 92-94 and
accompanying text (discussing Judge Dimock's concurring opinion). See also Brief for United
States, supra note 51, at 17 (neither the thirteenth amendment nor section 1584 prescribe the
means whereby involuntary servitude is achieved, nor does either provision suggest that the type
of conduct prohibited is limited to legal or physical coercion or fraud and deceit).
164. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1193.
165. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984). If,
for example, the victims in Mussry were well educated or knew a great deal about American
society, presumably they would have realized that they had been placed in a state of involuntary
servitude. Thus, merely because a victim is also an immigrant does not automatically mean that
any employment situation entered into apparently constitutes involuntary servitude. Hence the need
to prove that fraud or deceit existed.
166. In contrast with the comprehensive listing of types of coercion offered by the Kozminski
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v. United States,'67 the government alleged that the defendant offered
a Mexican alien a job as a chambermaid at the defendant's hotel in
San Antonio, Texas.'6 The defendant agreed in advance to pay the
alien's railroad fare back to Laredo, Texas if the arrangement became
undesirable. 169 The victim refused to prostitute for customers at the
defendant's brothel. 70 The defendant then demanded reimbursement
of the railroad fare, and threatened to reveal the victim's alien status
to the immigration authorities who would imprison the victim for five
years if the railroad fare was not reimbursed. 171 The court recognized
that the facts clearly proved that because the victim was indebted to
the defendant, the definition of peonage was satisfied, and the convic-
tion was thus upheld. 172 The court also took notice of suggestions by
the United States Supreme Court that the effect on the victim is
dispositive. 173 A different inquiry not previously noticed by the judiciary,
however, can be made by noting the similarity between Bernal and
United States v. Ingalls. 74 In both these cases, the defendant(s) offered
the victim a choice between continued servitude and incarceration. 175
The case of United States v. Bibbs16 spotlights the recurrent practice
of involuntary servitude in the agricultural products harvesting business.
In Bibbs, the workers were constantly indebted to the defendants,
since the defendants charged exorbitant prices for prepared meals,
groceries, housing, and other items. '17 When attempting to leave, the
court, the United States Supreme Court case of Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 201 (1904), has
held that the thirteenth amendment as enforced by the peonage statute, prohibits a status or
condition of involuntary servitude. Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 216. Accordingly, the types of coercion
used by the defendant are irrelevant. Id. However, the focus of a statement which defines peonage
in terms of the degree of coercion used against the victim is constitutional interpretation of the
thirteenth amendment as enforced by the peonage statute, as opposed to statutory construction of
the involuntary servitude statute.
167. 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
168. Bernal, 241 F. at 341.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. Bernal and United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964), are distinguishable.
The victim in Bernal was threatened with actual imprisonment by the state, whereas the victims
in Shackney were only faced with a threat of deportation, not a threat of incarceration. See supra
notes 75-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Shackney case).
172. Id. at 342. See supra note 24 (defining peonage).
173. Id. See supra note 165 (discussing Clyatt).
174. 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
175. Compare id. with Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245
U.S. 672 (1918).
176. 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978).
177. Id. at 1167. The defendants required the workers to eat at a camp kitchen while in North
Carolina. Id. When the workers were transported to Florida, the defendants permitted them to
shop at a local grocery store, but paid for the goods, and then charged the workers for these
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workers were threatened with bodily harm, and were severely beaten.'78
The victims remained in the employ of the defendant because they
feared for their lives. 179
The Bibbs court initially examined the validity of the charges with
reference to the effect of coercion on the victims.'10 The court stated,
however, that a showing of actual physical violence is necessary to
determine whether the victims refrained from escaping because of their
fear of the defendants. 8' Thus, while the Bibbs court attempted to
prohibit all forms of involuntary servitude by analyzing the effect of
coercion on the victim, in practice the court focused on the types of
coercion used by the defendants to place the victims in a state of
involuntary servitude.'5 2
The above cases demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
favors a results-oriented test for peonage prosecutions." 3 An exami-
nation of the Bernal and Bibbs cases, however, suggest that the types
of coercion used by the respective defendants were highly relevant to
an analysis of whether the victims were placed into a state of invol-
untary servitude. Consequently, while in theory the Fifth Circuit applies
a results-oriented definition, in practice courts ultimately fall back upon
an examination of the types of coercion utilized to compel service.
E. Analysis
The four definitions of involuntary servitude employed by the federal
courts can be broadly categorized as a conflict between those cases
groceries. Id. The farmers provided lodging for the workers for which the crew bosses were not
charged. Id. at 1166. The crew bosses did demand, however, that the workers pay rent to them
for such housing. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. See Peonage Hearings, supra note 2, at 18, 22 (1983) (testimony of Catholic social
worker and victims reciting similar accounts of the use of force to instill fear in victims).
180. Bibbs, 564 F.2d at 1167. The court noted that the victims who escaped being beaten
knew that the defendants had beaten other attempted escapees, and consequently, feared the
defendants. Id. at 1168.
181. Id.
182. Id. In another peonage prosecution in the Fifth Circuit, the defendant paid the fines of
women incarcerated in the State Prison for various offenses, who were then released into the
defendant's custody. Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cerl. denied, 324 U.S.
873 (1945). The women agreed to repay the defendant by working for the defendant as waitresses
at the defendant's bar and dance club. ld. The defendant subsequently forced the women into
prostitution, and held them in a state of peonage by means of physical violence. Id. As a result
of the violence, the victims feared the defendant. Id. at 85. The court affirmed the conviction on
the basis of the well-established definition of peonage, noting that the victims were retained in a
state of peonage by virtue of the monetary debt they owed to the defendant. Id. at 86. See supra
note 24 (defining peonage).
183. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1904); United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert.
denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
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which examine the means utilized to coerce the victims,' 4 and those
cases which scrutinize the end result of such coercion on the victim. 18
The more useful analysis places proscription of involuntary servitude
within the larger context of existing civil rights controversies arising
under first 86 and fourteenth amendment"'7 adjudication."'8 Under
first and fourteenth amendement principles, definitions of involuntary
servitude which focus either on the result of coercion on the victim or
the use of psychological coercion by the defendant would attempt to
measure the degree of coercion. Opposed to such definitions are those
which require either a showing of physical force, threat of legal process,
184. See United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 225
(1987); United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986);
United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); United States
v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983); United States v. Booker,
655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964); United
States v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. 1391 (,v.D. Mich. 1986), argued, No. 87-1040, 87-1041, 87-1042,
87-1072, 87-1073, 87-1074 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal.
1947); Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (D.C.M.D. Ala. 1903); United States v. Ancarola, I F. 676
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
185. See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007
(1978); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945);
Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
186. Professor Nimner categorically rejects reliance on an ad hoc balancing test in favor of
"definitional balancing" in first amendment adjudication since the latter provides a definite rule
for future application. M. Nnm, Nmmt oN FREEDOM oF SPEECH: A TRATIsE oN THE Fnsr
ADMENT= § 2.02, at 2-10, § 2.03, at 2-17 (1984). Moreover, Professor Nimmer points out that
tentative acceptance of such a doctrine can be observed in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S.
29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that case-by-case analysis in libel actions should not
be preferred over utilizing generally applicable rules which instead balance the competing principles
at stake), and Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974) (repudiating the ad hoc approach of
the Rosenbloom plurality and asserting that, since ad hoc balancing leads to "unpredictable
results and uncertain expectations," broad principles of general application must be promulgated).
M. NIMmR, supra, § 2.03, at 2-23.
187. One issue regarding the application of the fourteenth amendment is whether significant
state action exists when a facially private act of discrimination occurs. Compare Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (finding presence of "significant state action"
where a private cafe rented space from a city agency and racially discriminated) with Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (granting of a liquor licence to a private club which
racially discriminates is not significant state involvement). See Choper, Thoughts on State Action,
1979 WvASH. U.L.Q. 757, 762, 764-65 (1979) (reliance on subjective balancing inquiry in state
action cases eviscerates distinction between state action and private action, which for reasons of
"political constraints and collective good sense" would not otherwise occur); L. TRIBE, AimwCAN
CoNsTrrunoNAL LAw 1691 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the significant state action test as a "failure");
Black, State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HAv. L. Rzv. 69, 95
(1967) (describing the significant state action test as a "conceptual disaster area"). See also Haber,
Notes on the Limits of Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RuTGERS L. REv. 811, 813 (1964); Van Alstyne
& Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. Rnv. 3, 44-45 (1961); W. LoccHART, Y. KAmisAR, J. CHoPER,
& S. SHmFFN, CONS'TrrunoNAL LAw: CAs s ComMENTs QuEsTiONs 1437 (6th ed. 1986) (suggesting
that inquiry must be whether the state policy preference denied equal protection between conflict-
ing individual claims, rather than whether state action has risen to some quantum level of
"significant").
188. Telephone interview with Douglas S. Hobbs, Vice-Chairman and Professor of Political
Science at the University of California, Los Angeles (Nov. 5, 1987) (notes on file at the Pacific
Law Journal). Professor Hobbs has rather eloquently characterized the controversy as "attempting
to cut the cake vertically rather than horizontally." Id.
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or fraud or deceit perpetrated against certain vulnerable persons, which
consequently examine specific types of coercion provable by objective
criteria. With reference to congressional intent the focus of the courts
must be to determine what types of coercion, rather than what degree
of coercion, society is unwilling to permit.
Such an analysis does not characterize the cases as involuntary
servitude or peonage prosecutions, a differentiation which makes ad-
judication of specific cases more difficult." 9 Furthermore, this proposed
analytical framework has the beneficial effect of drawing upon the
wealth of prior judicial and scholarly thought. 19° Finally, since a
definition of involuntary servitude evidenced by the types of coercion
used to compel service is not based upon a subjective interpretation of
the statute, ideological biases are not injected into the judicial process. 19'
PROPOSAL
For the most part, courts have consistently failed to realize that
congressional intent provides a fairly comprehensive definition of in-
voluntary servitude. Since the precise definition of involuntary servitude
is incomplete, practitioners, employers, and juries' 92 have difficulty
determining when the involuntary servitude statute is applicable. The
legislative histories of sections 1581 and 1584 indicate that Congress
189. Compare, United States v. Kozininski (1986) (panel) (unreported) (full text of opinion
printed in United States of America, Petitioner v. Ike Kozminski, et. al. Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 72a-106a (June 15, 1986,
United States Supreme Court)) with United States v. Kozrninski, 921 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987).
190. See supra notes 186-88 (discussing favorable acceptance of definitional balancing and
disapproval of ad hoc balancing). See infra note 191 (discussing favorable acceptance of definitional
balancing and disapproval of ad hoc balancing).
191. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 1811 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In
Rosenbloom, Justice Harlan commented that in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
"we ... announced a rule of general application not ordinarily dependent for its implementation
upon a case-by-case examination of trial court verdicts .... At least where we can discern generally
applicable rules that should balance with fair precision the competing interests at stake, such rules
should be preferred" to an ad hoc balancing approach. Id. at 63. Justice Marshall agreed with
his conservative colleague's conclusion:
This [ad hoc] balancing scale may arguably be a more finely tuned instrument in a
particular case. But whatever precision the ad hoc method supplies is achieved at a
substantial cost in predictability and certainty.
Id. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. The jury system has been severely criticized by one of the most perceptive jurists on the
Second Circuit. See J. FRANK, LAW AND BnE MoDEr MinD 180-81 (1930) (concluding that since
jurors "are hopelessly incompetent as fact-finders," they make "the orderly administration of
justice virtually impossible"). See Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) (holding that
a statute which leaves judges and juries free to determine without any legally fixed requirements
what is and is not prohibited in a particular case is unconstitutionally vague).
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intended to proscribe certain types of coercion in relation to all persons
and to protect vulnerable classes of persons by virtue of their status
as minors, immigrants, or mentally retarded. 193 In cases such as United
States v. Mussry,'94 United States v. Bernal,95 and United States v.
Bibbs,196 the legal analysis as to whether psychological coercion was
present or whether the use of any means of coercion resulted in a
condition of involuntary servitude is so dependent upon the facts that
ad hoe decisionmaking is the result. 97 Consequently, the implicit listing
of types of coercion provided by Congress is ignored.9 8 Finally, reliance
on a results-oriented approach or a psychological coercion standard
increases the danger of frivolous claims, 199 and increases the possibility
of precluding meritorious prosecutions due to the mental deficiencies
of the victim.20
193. See supra notes 36-70 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
involuntary servitude statute).
194. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984). See supra notes 119-32 and
accompanying text (discussing the Mussry case).
195. 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918). See supra notes 167-75 and
accompanying text (discussing the Bernal case).
196. 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978). See supra notes 176-
82 and accompanying text (discussing the Bibbs case).
197. Such a balancing test is arguably overinclusive, since a criminal statute "must be strictly
construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity. . . ." United States v. Enmons,
410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973). See also United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487 (1964) (citing
the same proposition as embodied in Enmons by reference to Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81,
83 (1955)). See also Brief for the United States, supra note 51, at 38. The government grudgingly
concedes that the determination of "whether a person has been held to involuntary servitude may
be a matter of degree in a particular case." Id.
198. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Kozminski,
821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987). Consequently, this approach is
potentially underinclusive.
199. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Plaintiff, a major league professional baseball player,
challenged the reserve system of baseball on antitrust, peonage, and thirteenth amendment grounds.
Flood, 316 F. Supp. at 272. In denying the claim of the plaintiff under section 1581 the trial
court referred to the controlling precedent of Shackney in pointing out that Flood still could
exercise a choice between continued servitude and liberty; namely play for the Philadelphia Phillies,
or retire. Id. at 281.
200. J. WVmEsrmN & M. BERGER, 3 WENsTEI's EvDENCE: ComMENTARY ON RULEs OF
EviDENCE FOR TE UNmTED STATES COU'RTS AND FOR STATE COUnRTS 601[4] (1987). The viability
of the Mussry test exhibits grave problems where the category of mental incompetency is concerned.
By definition, a general objective standard cannot be used to determine whether a person who
has already been classified as having a reasoning deficiency felt compelled to labor. A purely
subjective test also exhibits problems, even though mental incompetents are usually permitted to
testify in court as long as the trial judge is satisfied not only that the testimony is competent, but
that the testimony is relevant. Id. The value of such testimony is highly suspect by virtue of the
nature of the charge, since one is not inquiring into specific events, but instead ascertaining the
subjective opinion of the victim. Thus, a mentally retarded person with an IQ lower than 60 or
67 might very well believe himself not to be in a state of involuntary servitude, whereas almost
any rational person, when examining the type of coercion which resulted, would vehemently
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A workable test for determining whether a state of involuntary
servitude exists should first analyze whether the method of coercion is
a type society will not tolerate.2° The types of coercion listed by the
Kozminski court2 serve as a benchmark for determining whether this
first prong has been met. Second, a test for involuntary servitude must
determine whether the victim is denied a real choice between liberty
and slavery.2 3 By using this bifircated approach, problems associated
with ad hoc decisionmaking are eliminated, and the intent of Congress
is closely followed. Finally, additions to the list of types of coercion
prohibited may be made, as long as the consensus is that such conduct
is a strong indication that the labor was coerced. 20
Virtually all of the cases described in this comment can be reconciled
by means of this two-pronged test, such that prior case results are left
intact. For example, in United States v. Shackney,205 neither force nor
use of legal process was present, thus the first prong has not been
satisfied. Moreover, according to the Shackney court, a threat of
deportation still afforded the employee a choice between continued
servitude and freedom from incarceration, since a threat of deportation
by itself fails to physically confine a person.206 Thus, the second
requirement had not been met and consequently, according to the
disagree. Consequently, where the mental retardation is so severe that the retardation affects the
victim's capacity to observe, remember, and truthfully narrate the event, the judge must bar the
testimony completely. United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1973). As a result,
in certain circumstances, otherwise meritorious prosecutions would have to be foregone due to the
mental inability of the victim to testify as to his beliefs. Arguably, the problems inherent in the
use of either a purely subjective or a general objective standard tend to intimate that the better
alternative is to reject both and adopt what is implicit in Kozminski. In other words, in involuntary
servitude prosecutions, only specific objective criteria are relevant, namely whether the victim is
mentally retarded, immature, or an immigrant.
201. See supra notes 146-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Kozminski test).
202. Force, threat of force, or legal process, or fraud and deceit in relation to minors, mentally
retarded persons, and immigrants, if any of these persons possess certain cognizable deficiencies.
See United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, United
States v. Kozminski, 108 S. CL 225 (1987).
203. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964); Pierce v. United States, 146
F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945); United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp.
76 (C.D. Cal. 1947).
204. This determination may be made by answering the following two questions. First, the
new type of coercion must be found to b- "equivalent to imprisonment or worse." United States
v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964). Second, since the inquiry as to the definition of
involuntary servitude is primarily a question of statutory construction, the new type of coercion
must also have a strong foundation in the legislative history of the involuntary servitude statute.
See supra notes 36-70 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the involuntary
servitude statute).
205. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964). See supra notes 75-94 and accompanying text (discussing
the Shackney case).
206. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 486.
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court, a state of involuntary servitude did not exist. In contrast, all
the defendants in United States v. Harris0 and United States v.
Bibbs,25 to cite just two examples, perpetrated acts of physical violence
against their victims, commensurate with the first part of the bifurcated
analysis. Because the defendants also prohibited the victims from
leaving, none of the victims could exercise a choice between continued
servitude and freedom. Consequently, the second part of the proposed
test is satisfied. Thus, in all cases discussed above, except in United
States v. Shackney, a state of involuntary servitude resulted.
In United States v. Ingalls2°9 and Bernal v. United States,210 the types
of coercion used by the defendants were threats to initiate criminal
prosecutions which would result in incarceration by the state. This use
of legal process to compel labor meets the requirements of the first
prong. Moreover, the victims had a "choice" between remaining
enslaved to the defendants, or being incarcerated by the state. Conse-
quently, the second part of the proposed test has been satisfied, and
the results in both cases remain unchanged.
In United States v. Ancarola,211 children were enticed into slavery
by means of fraud or deceit, as were the Indonesian immigrants in
United States v. Mussr'y, 212 and the mentally retarded men in United
States v. Kozminski.21 3 Thus, the first prong of the proposed analysis
207. 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983). See supra notes 95-103 and
accompanying text (discussing the Harris case).
208. 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978). See supra notes 176-
82 and accompanying text (discussing the Bibbs case).
209. 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947). See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text (discussing
the Ingalls case).
210. 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918). See supra notes 167-75 and
accompanying text (discussing the Bernal case).
211. 1 F. 676 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880). See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text (discussing
the Ancarola case).
212. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984). See supra notes 119-32 and
accompanying text (discussing the Mussry case).
213. 821 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, United States v. Kozminski, 108
S. Ct. 225 (1987). See supra notes 146-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Kozminski case).
The test cannot be applied to the Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (D.C.M.D. Ala. 1903), since no
prosecution was at issue. The outcome in Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I.
1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (1979), might be particularly troublesome for some scholars, since
"brainwashing" does not easily fall into any category described above. Nevertheless, a solution is
possible. If a compelling amount of evidence is presented to show by objective criteria that the
mind of the alleged victim was so severely altered by the actions of the defendant that the victim
was totally unable to choose between continued servitude and liberty, then a victim could be placed
into the category of mentally incompetent. An involuntary servitude prosecution thus becomes
possible. Caution, however, is necessary to ensure that the free exercise clause of the first
amendment is not transgressed. See United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir.),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 225 (1987) (criticizing the use of section 1584 against the day-to-day
activities of "cult groups, communes and religious orders").
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has been satisfied. By virtue of their cultural, mental, or juvenile
deficiencies, all of the victims were unable to exercise a choice between
freedom and slavery. Since the second part of the test is met, none of
the convictions in these cases would be reversed under a bifurcated
analysis.
CONCLUSION
The meaning of the involuntary servitude statute has been puzzled
over by courts for decades. The intent of Congress indicates, however,
that all persons are protected from certain types of coercion perpetrated
against them in order to compel labor, namely, physical violence or
the threat of legal process. Moreover, minors, immigrants, and mental
incompetents are protected to an even greater extent than the general
population in order that their labor is not coerced by fraud or deceit,
even in the absence of force or threat of legal process. Use of a two-
pronged test will better effectuate the intent of Congress. First, the
types of coercion used should be examined in order to determine
whether Congress has prohibited a certain type of coercive conduct.
Second, a court must determine whether the employee could exercise
a realistic choice between continued servitude and liberty. If this
bifurcated test is adopted by the United States Supreme Court, juries
and lower courts will be forced to focus on types of coercion, rather
than degrees of coercion. Such a test avoids the almost inevitable
subjective problems a degree-based analysis entails and the implicit
listing of types of coercion provided by Congress is followed. Moreover,
such a test precludes the possibility of frivolous claims, and eliminates
the possibility of precluding meritorious prosecutions due to the mental
deficiencies of the victim. Thus, by the use of this bifurcated test, the
purpose of the thirteenth amendment and its enforcement mechanisms
are satisfied, while at the same time the foundation of capitalism, a
"system of free and voluntary labor," is preserved.
James Henry Haag
